We introduce fairness into three models of pretrial settlement and find that it increases the incidence of trial in each. This is true despite the fact that the fairness taste parameter is common knowledge. In the standard model, the party who makes the final offer can extract essentially all of her bargaining partner's trial cost through this offer. A taste for fairness is reflected in the percentage of their own trial costs a party is willing to give up in accepting this final offer. In the Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) models a taste for fairness on the part of the defendant lowers the costs of rejected offers to the plaintiff and so increases the incidence of trial. In the Shavell (1982) model, a taste for fairness reduces and may eliminate the contract zone, thereby increasing the incidence of trial.
Introduction
When individuals feel they are being treated unfairly, they may take costly actions not predicted by standard rationality models. For example, from the experimental literature, it is well known that recipients of a take-it-or-leave-it offer may reject such an offer if it is perceived to be too low, even if they then receive nothing as a result of this rejection. In this paper we conduct a theoretical examination of how a taste for fairness affects dispute rates in three standard models of litigation and settlement. In all three of these models, we find that a preference for being treated fairly increases the dispute rate, even though this preference is common knowledge.
In the context of pretrial bargaining, the plaintiff's and defendant's costs incurred at trial form a joint surplus which may be gained if the case settles prior to trial. 1 The party with the power to make the final offer has an ability to extract essentially the entire surplus through this offer. However, it is a rather robust result from the experimental literature that the party with the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer does not extract the entire joint surplus from settlement.
There are two prominent reasons why this might be so. First, the person making the offer may, out of considerations of fairness, offer some of the joint surplus to her bargaining partner. Since this motive is unlikely to be important in an adversarial setting such as pretrial bargaining, we will not emphasize this motive in our theoretical model. The second reason is that the recipient of the offer may reject it if it is not viewed as sufficiently fair. This behavior is exhibited in the laboratory, even when significant sums of money are at stake. It is this aspect of behavior that we will emphasize in our model. We consider a model in which the plaintiff makes a take-it-orleave-it offer to the defendant. In our model, a known taste for fairness on the part of the defendant will be reflected by the percentage of her own court costs she is willing to pay (in addition to the expected judgment) to the plaintiff in order to avoid trial.
Suppose party A and party B are to divide $10. In the ultimatum game, party A can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to B. If the offer is rejected, both parties received nothing. Under a strict model of rationality without fairness, A will offer B $.01, which B will accept. Results from laboratory experiments show that A will offer B substantially more than $.01 and that B will reject low offers. 2 Slonim and Roth (1998) report on ultimatum game experiments conducted in the Slovak Republic, where stakes in the game were varied by a factor of 25. While they did find that rejection rates decreased in the high stakes game and that offers became lower in these games, their results still differed significantly from what a rational model without fairness would predict.
In their high stakes game, the players bargained over the equivalent of 62.5 hours of wages. Offers less than 25% of the available pie were rejected 60% of the time in the experiment, while 37.5% of the offers between 25% and 30% of the pie were rejected. Over half the offers represented between 40% and 45% of the total pie, and only 5% of these were rejected (Slonim and Roth, pp. 577) . Thus, even with high stakes in a simple bargaining environment, there is a significant deviation from the prediction of the standard theory.
In the ultimatum game, the joint surplus from settlement is the total amount the players are bargaining over. In pretrial bargaining, the joint surplus from settlement is the sum the plaintiff's and defendant's court costs. Thus in our model, an increased taste for fairness on the part of the defendant is modeled as an increased willingness to reject offers which attempt to extract too high a percentage of her costs at trial. For example, suppose the expected judgment at trial is $100,000 and the defendant's costs at trial are $30,000. With no taste for fairness in the model, the defendant will accept all settlement demands up to 130,000. A defendant with a taste for fairness might refuse all offers above $125,000, and another defendant with a greater taste for fairness might refuse all offers above $120,000.
Matthew Rabin (1993) is one of the first to formally incorporate fairness into game theory. He models agents who are willing to sacrifice their own well being either to help those who are kind to them or to harm those who are unkind. Rabin incorporates fairness into a variety of standard games, including Battle of the Sexes, Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. He also incorporates fairness into analyses of monopoly pricing and labor economics. The monopoly pricing example is closest to the analysis in this paper. In that model, fairness considerations lead the consumer to refuse to buy if the monopolist attempts to extract too much of the joint surplus from the sale. Similarly, in our model, if the player making the offer attempts to extract too much of the joint surplus from settlement, the offer will be rejected.
We incorporate fairness into the models of Bebchuk (1984) , Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Shavell (1982) . In Bebchuk, an uninformed plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave it offer to an informed defendant while in Reinganum and Wilde an informed plaintiff makes a take-itor-leave-it offer to an uninformed defendant. Asymmetric information drives a failure to settle in both models. Despite the fact that we model a taste for fairness as common knowledge, it increases the incidence of trial in both models. 3 In both cases, the inability of the player making the offer to extract the full surplus from settlement lessens the cost of having their offer rejected.
In the Bebchuk model, this makes the plaintiff more aggressive in his offers to the defendant. In
Reinganum and Wilde's signaling model, this effect makes it less costly for a player to misrepresent his type through his offer. Thus, in order to maintain the separating equilibrium an offer associated with a given type is rejected more often to prevent plaintiffs with weaker cases from making an offer associated with stronger cases.
In Shavell (1982) , the plaintiff and defendant each have exogenous beliefs about the probability that the plaintiff will prevail at trial. When these beliefs coincide, the existence of positive court costs creates a contract zone in which mutually agreed upon settlements are possible. If the plaintiff's belief that he will prevail at trial sufficiently exceeds the defendant's, a trial will result. A taste for fairness by either party will shrink the contract zone and may make it disappear. Thus, a taste for fairness increases the likelihood of trial in this model as well.
Fairness in a Screening Model
Consider Bebchuk's (1984) basic screening model in which the defendant has private information concerning the probability of being found liable, and the plaintiff is given the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. How will this model change when the defendant considers the fairness of the offer received?
In Bebchuk's original model, a defendant will accept any offer, O p , such that
where p is the probability the plaintiff will prevail at trial, J is the judgment received by the plaintiff if he prevails and C D are the court costs to be paid by the defendant.
This assumes that the defendant is risk neutral and attempts to maximize her expected monetary income by her decision. Suppose instead that the defendant is willing to reject some offers that she considers unfair, even if that rejection leaves her worse off in a strictly monetary sense. In other words, she is willing to pay some expected cost to satisfy her preference for being treated fairly. Define a parameter α to be the minimum percentage of her court costs that the defendant must retain if she is to agree to settle. She will then reject any offer such that
. Thus, she is willing to pay (in an expected value sense) as much as αC D to punish offers she considers unfair.
The probability p that the plaintiff will prevail at trial is known by the defendant but not the plaintiff. A defendant's type is defined by this probability. Thus, an offer O P will be accepted by defendants of type J
. Let this expression hold as an equality to obtain the cutoff defendant type:
All defendants of type p p ≥ accept the offer O P , while all those of type p p < reject the offer.
If the value of α is common knowledge, how will it affect the plaintiff's offer and the incidence of trial? Following Bebchuk's analysis, the plaintiff knows that defendant types are distributed by g(p). Knowing the defendant's decision criteria for accepting offers, the plaintiff recognizes that a given offer, O p , will be accepted with probability )) ( ( 1
. The plaintiff will choose his optimal offer to maximize
where the last term is the expected payoff at trial for the plaintiff conditional on the rejection of O p . The plaintiff's court costs are denoted C P . We assume that aJ>C p , so that the plaintiff always has a credible threat to proceed to trial. 4 The first and second order conditions from the maximization of (2) imply
The left-hand side of (3) reflects the marginal benefit of raising the settlement demand by $1. This is simply the additional dollar gained on all cases that settle. The right-hand side reflects the marginal cost of raising the demand by $1. This is incurred through increased rejections reflected by ) ( p g . When an offer is rejected, the plaintiff loses (in an expected value sense) his own court costs C p , plus that portion of the defendant's court costs
he is able to extract through his offer. When α rises, the plaintiff can extract less surplus from the defendant and this lowers the cost of rejected offers to the plaintiff.
To find the effect of an increase in α on the incidence of trial and the equilibrium offer totally differentiate (1) and (3) to get
From (5), an increase in α raises the borderline defendant type which results in an increase in the incidence of trial. The effect on the offer in (6) is ambiguous and depends upon the sign of ) ( ' p g . At the original offer, fewer defendants will settle, so the left-hand side of (3) is lower
. This causes the equilibrium offer to fall. However, as discussed above, increased demands for fairness by the defendant imply lower costs to the plaintiff of having an offer rejected. This effect makes the plaintiff more aggressive and tends to raise the offer. Thus the overall effect on the offer is ambiguous.
It is interesting that an increased taste for fairness on the part of the defendant can cause the equilibrium offer to the defendant to rise. If this offer rises, then combined with the increased incidence of trial, the effect of an increased demand for fairness would seem to make the defendant unambiguously worse off. However, if the offer falls then the effect on defendant welfare would appear to be ambiguous. There are more trials, but the cases that settle do so on more favorable terms.
Fairness in a Signaling Model
In this section we base our analysis on Reinganum and Wilde's (1986) signaling model in which the plaintiff knows the true level of damages, J, where J is used to define the plaintiff type.
The probability p of a judgment for the plaintiff is common knowledge. The defendant knows that the judgment is distributed by F(J), where J and J are the lower and upper supports of this distribution and P C J p > . This last inequality ensures that the plaintiff always has a credible threat to proceed to trial. Since this is a signaling model, the informed plaintiff makes a single take-it-or-leave-it offer to the defendant. As before, we assume that the defendant has a taste for fairness such that he will accept an offer iff
, where B(O P ) is the defendant's belief about the plaintiff type J conditional on having received the offer O P . The maximum offer the defendant will accept is
When (7) holds, the defendant is just indifferent between accepting and rejecting the plaintiff's offer.
Reinganum and Wilde confine their analysis to separating equilibria in which the offer provides a correct signal of the plaintiff's type. Although other equilibria exist, they appeal to refinements based upon Banks and Sobel (1987) and state that the separating equilibrium is the universally divine equilibrium. Thus, we also consider only a separating equilibrium under which there is a unique mapping between the offer O P and the plaintiff's type J.
Following Reinganum and Wilde's analysis, we consider a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the defendant rejects an offer with some probability ) ( P O ϕ . The plaintiff makes an offer so as to maximize his wealth, while taking the rejection function ) ( P O ϕ as given. The plaintiff's expected wealth V P can be written as
The plaintiff will maximize (8) yielding the following first order condition:
In equilibrium the defendant's beliefs about the plaintiff's type must be correct. Thus we have B*(O P *(J))=J. Substituting this condition into (7) provides the equilibrium offer as a function of the plaintiff's type:
The offer in (10) will leave the defendant indifferent between accepting or rejecting the plaintiff's offer. As such, it is consistent with a mixed strategy equilibrium under which the plaintiff's offer is rejected with some probability. Substitute (10) into (9) to get the following differential equation:
A specific solution to this differential equation is
where
represents a boundary condition using the lowest possible level of the judgment. Note using (10) that
. Rewriting Ψ in this fashion allows us to put the probability of rejection in (12) in terms of exogenous variables only. This rejection function induces "truthful" revelation by plaintiffs in the sense that each will submit offers consistent with (10). Higher offers are rejected more frequently in order to discourage plaintiffs with low values of J from "bluffing" by submitting offers associated with high values of J.
To find the effect of an increased taste for fairness on the equilibrium probability of rejection, differentiate (12) with respect to α to get
For all plaintiff types J J > , the probability of trial increases as the defendant's taste for fairness increases. Thus, as with the screening model, the probability of trial rises with an increased taste for fairness. From (10) we have
; an increased taste for fairness on the part of the defendant causes the offer to unambiguously fall. Intuitively, the plaintiff must make a more reasonable offer since the maximum surplus he can extract from the defendant has fallen.
The probability of rejection ) ( * P O ϕ is designed to induce "truthful" offers from the plaintiff by increasing the probability of rejection as the plaintiff's offer rises. The cost of a rejected offer to the plaintiff is his court costs plus the share of the defendant's costs he can extract through his settlement offer:
. An increase in α lowers the cost of a rejected offer to the plaintiff, since he can extract less of the defendant's cost of trial in his settlement offer. Thus, when α rises the probability of rejection must be increased in order to maintain the incentives for the plaintiff to submit a truthful offer. As a result the equilibrium probability of a trial increases.
As the defendant's taste for fairness rises, the plaintiff is unambiguously harmed since he must submit a lower offer to the defendant while enduring a higher probability of trial. The effect on the defendant is ambiguous. The probability of trial is higher, but those who settle out of court pay less to the plaintiff.
Fairness in an Optimism Model
In Shavell (1982) , the plaintiff and defendant have exogenous beliefs about the probability the plaintiff will prevail at trial. 5 There is no explicit bargaining in this model; rather the focus is on the size and existence of a contract zone within which a mutually agreeable bargain may be struck. In the absence of such a contract zone, no agreement will be reached and a trial will result. Thus, a plaintiff who believes he will win J in damages with probability p p will accept any amount greater than or equal to p P J -C P . Similarly, a defendant will pay no more than p D J + C D . This model concludes that as long as
the parties will settle. This condition will fail to hold if the gap in beliefs D P p p − is positive and sufficiently large.
If a taste for fairness by the plaintiff and defendant is added to the model (α P and α D respectively) then the plaintiff will demand at least p P J -(1-α P ) C P , while the defendant is willing to pay at most p D J + (1-α D )C D . Thus, the condition under which there exists a settlement range
. The left-hand side is monotonically decreasing in both α D and α P ; increased demands for fairness by either party make it less likely this condition will hold and more likely that a trial will result.
In Priest and Klein (1984) sufficiently large, a trial results. As with Shavell, a taste for fairness by either party will lead to an increased incidence of trials in this model, since it will shrink and possibly eliminate the contract zone.
Conclusion
We find a robust result across three different models of pretrial settlement that an increased demand for fairness results in a greater incidence of trial. In our two models of asymmetric information this is true despite the fact that the parameter reflecting a taste for fairness is common knowledge. The main reason for this result is that a taste for fairness on the part of the recipient of the offer lowers the cost of rejection to the party making the offer. In the Bebchuk model, this results in more aggressive offers by the plaintiff and in the Reinganum and
Wilde model this requires a greater probability of rejection to induce "truthful" offers. In the Shavell (1982) model, increased demand for fairness by either party shrinks the contract zone and can lead to its elimination.
In the Bebchuk model, the effect of an increased demand for fairness by the defendant can either raise or lower the plaintiff's offer. Thus we have the surprising theoretical possibility that an increased demand for fairness by the defendant may be met by a less attractive offer.
